Producers of cultural goods and media products can make their speci…c contents available to their audiences and readerships only through a particular language. The choice of language is a non-trivial decision in markets with bilingual or multilingual consumers. In this paper I argue that, the very existence of bilingual consumers may seriously bias market outcomes against minority languages. In particular, I show that the level of linguistic diversity determined by pro…t maximizing …rms tends to be ine¢ ciently low, except when and where the cost of producing a second linguistic version becomes su¢ ciently low. Thus, the model provides an e¢ ciency argument supporting policies that protect the presence of minority languages in these markets. JEL Classi…cation numbers: D43, L13, L82
Introduction
Producers of cultural goods (like books and …lms) and media products (newspapers, TV and radio) can make their speci…c contents available to their audiences and readerships only through a particular language. The choice of language is a trivial decision if consumers are monolingual. However, in many local markets, as well as in the global market, a substantial fraction of consumers are competent in more than one language. It is precisely the presence of multilingual consumers that makes language selection a di¢ cult decision for …rms and a sensitive issue for the general public. Let us …rst discuss this topic in the context of the global market. It is well known that the expansion of English as a second language has accelerated over the last decades.
1 Some commentators have expressed their concern about the potential negative e¤ect of this expansion on the presence and di¤usion of other languages. For now the signals are weak but non-negligible. For instance, US and UK-based TV stations specialized in international news are attracting larger audiences around the world. At the same time stations based in nonEnglish speaking countries have set up English channels (Al Jazeera, Russia Today, France 24) 2 . Films and books originally made in English already enjoy a clearly dominant position in world markets, although they are typically translated or dubbed into local languages. However, incentives to pay the costs of translation and dubbing may be signi…cantly reduced as consumers' competence in English is enhanced.
Clearly, both the expansion of English as a second language and the integration of cultural goods and media markets is likely to speed up in the coming years and will probably convey very substantial bene…ts. However, they may also involve signi…cant costs and market failures that we need to pay attention to. In particular, the reduction in the degree of linguistic diversity may speci…cally harm monolingual social groups; but more generally, it may negatively a¤ect those consumers whose mother tongue is not English and have a preference for consuming these products in a di¤erent language. Moreover, the presence of a particular language in the media and cultural goods markets is crucial for its vitality and prestige, potentially in ‡uencing its medium and long-term dynamics.
1 According to The Economist (Dec 13th 2006) nearly a quarter of the world's population speaks some English. That includes those who speak it as their mother tongue (400 million), and those who speak it ‡uently as their second language (another 400 million). It is also estimated that about a billion are learning it. Graddol (2006) argues that the last …gure is likely to double within a decade.
2 The incentives to adopt English are probably stronger on the internet. A prominent example is the electronic version of Der Spiegel, Spiegel Online International. Some major European newspapers are also considering similar moves.
Geographic areas where the majority of the population is bilingual can provide useful insights on the long-run implications of the expansion of English. Take the example of Catalonia. A very large fraction of the 7 million inhabitants can speak and read the two main languages: Catalan and Spanish (Castilian). Surveys conducted over the last twenty years indicate that Spanish is the family language for roughly half of the population, while Catalan is for the other half (data on daily use of the two languages also show approximately the same …fty-…fty pattern.) 3 One could naively expect that one half of consumption of cultural goods and media products in Catalonia would be in Catalan and the other half in Spanish. But this is not the case, especially if we focus on non-subsidized, privately provided goods and services. More speci…cally, 24% of the TV audience consumes programs in Catalan, but only a tiny fraction is broadcast by private stations. Similarly, 43% of the radio audiences correspond to programs in Catalan, but the fraction that is supplied by private radio stations is also small. Private supply in Catalan is higher in the newspaper and book markets. About 22% of the newspapers and 20% of books (excluding textbooks) consumed in Catalonia are in Catalan. Finally, the consumption of …lms dubbed into Catalan or originally produced in this language is close to zero (subtitles are rarely used in Spain). 4 It is important to emphasize that only a few extra million consumers outside Catalonia speak or read Catalan, while in most of these examples the relevant market is either Spain (46 million, all competent in Spanish) or the world's Spanish speaking population (approximately, 400 million.)
These indicators can be interpreted in di¤erent ways. Nevertheless, the low private provision of products in Catalan, combined with the wide political support for the public …nancing of TV and radio stations that broadcast programs exclusively in Catalan 5 , suggest that market outcomes might be 3 See, for instance, Generalitat de Catalunya (2003) , Les estadístiques d'usos lingüís-tics. The most recent surveys (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2008, Les estadístiques d'usos lingüístics) indicate that the fraction of the Catalan-oriented population has fallen below 50%, probably as a result of recent immigration ‡ows. However, the …fty-…fty distribution is still a good approximation for consumers of books, newspapers and …lms (FUNDACC, 2008, Baròmetre de la Comunicació i la Cultura). 4 These indicators have been provided by industry associations and audience monitoring agencies. The …gures given in the text are averages over the period 1999-2008. 5 The charter of the Catalan TV and radio networks was approved in the regional parliament by unanimity in 1983. It was reformed in 2007 with the support of 87% of the members of the parliament. biased against minority languages.
As suggested above, the relationship between linguistic preferences and market outcomes is dynamic with causality running both ways. This paper contributes to our understanding of these issues by focusing on the causality from preferences to outcomes. In particular, I ask whether or not markets tend to provide too little linguistic diversity for a given distribution of linguistic preferences. Thus, I analyze a static model of product variety where consumers have preferences over the intrinsic characteristics (content) as well as the language of the product. 6 The model is agnostic about the origin of linguistic tastes. A preference for a particular language may simply re ‡ect higher pro…ciency or, on the contrary, the desire to learn the language. It could also emerge from ideological, or even esthetic, reasons. Consumers belong to distinct linguistic communities of unequal size. These communities are not completely segmented, in the sense that members of the minority are bilingual, while the majority members may be bilingual (symmetric bilingualism) or monolingual (asymmetric bilingualism). Bilingual consumers are not indi¤erent about the language of the product; they strictly prefer to consume products in one of the languages (say, their mother tongue), although they may be willing to consume products in their second language depending on availability, content preferences, and price di¤erentials.
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The model extends the spokes framework (Chen and Riordan, 2007) by adding an additional dimension of product di¤erentiation (language). Thus, consumers may trade o¤ a good match in terms of content against a good linguistic match. In fact, a key parameter of the model is the degree of linguistic substitutability relative to the substitutability of contents. It is very convenient to start o¤ by assuming that each variety (de…ned by its content) must be supplied in a single language (the adoption model). Next, the analysis is extended by allowing …rms to provide more than one linguistic version of each variety (the translation model). In the real world, translations have 6 There is a huge literature on optimal product diversity. The most signi…cant milestones include Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , Salop (1979) , Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Chen and Riordan (2007) . These are models where product di¤erentiation is unidimensional. 7 The model considers only two languages. Thus, it can be interpreted as an analysis of the e¤ect of market outcomes on" linguistic minorities", rather than a model of "linguistic diversity", which probably evokes an arbitrary number of languages. However, I believe that if the model is expanded to allow for more than two languages then it would deliver similar results (as long as there is a dominant language shared by a majority of consumers). Moreover, the label will hopefully remind the reader that this is a model of two-dimensional "product diversity". always been very important in the book and …lm industries, but nowadays they are also present in many other industries, including newspapers.
The main results of the paper are the following. Firstly, in the adoption model market forces are biased against minority languages; that is, the fraction of varieties in the minority language supplied in equilibrium is below the level that maximizes total surplus (the level of linguistic diversity is ine¢ ciently low). Let us consider the social planner's problem. If the degree of linguistic substitutability is not too high (with respect to the size of the minority community) then it is e¢ cient to supply a positive fraction of varieties in the minority language, since a fraction of consumers can be assigned to products on the basis of their linguistic preferences, which more than compensates the content mismatch. In fact, as the degree of linguistic substitutability falls (i.e., the intensity of linguistic preferences increases), or as the size of the minority community increases, then the optimal fraction of varieties in the minority language increases. However, private incentives to supply goods in the minority language are smaller than social incentives. The main driving force of this result is the size of the consumer base. Actually, this is the only force in a regulated environment where prices are …xed exogenously (and independently of the language of the product). In this case, no …rm would ever …nd it pro…table to supply its product in the minority language, since that would imply lower sales. In an unregulated environment, however, some …rms may be willing to specialize, adopt the minority language, and take advantage of the higher willingness to pay of members of the minority linguistic community. However, a …rm that switches to the minority language is unable to capture all the potential surplus that could be generated. The reason is standard: the …rm's inability to price discriminate between marginal and inframarginal consumers.
The second main result concerns the translation model. In this case, the market outcome may exhibit insu¢ cient or excessive linguistic diversity. However, unlike most models of product di¤erentiation, the sign of the ine¢ -ciency can be associated with the value of observable variables. In particular, excessive diversity arises only in markets where the cost of translation is so low that the fraction of products in the minority language is disproportionately high with respect to the relative size of the linguistic minority. In order to understand this result it is important to note that in the extreme symmetric case where both linguistic communities have the same size, despite the fact that the level of linguistic diversity is always e¢ cient, the market allocation is ine¢ cient because …rms tend to generate too many translations.
The reason is that most consumers attracted by a second linguistic version of a particular variety come from rival …rms (business stealing e¤ect). Thus, in the asymmetric case, the ambiguous result is a combination of the forces described in the adoption model and the excessive incentives to translate. In particular, if the cost of translation is relatively high then we are very close to the adoption model. In contrast, if the cost of translation is su¢ ciently low then in equilibrium most …rms o¤er a second linguistic version in order to steal consumers from rival …rms.
Summarizing, the adoption model formalizes the widespread perception that market forces tend to work against minority languages. However, the e¢ ciency of market outcomes is likely to improve as the application of new technologies reduces the costs of translations. If the cost reduction is su¢ -ciently drastic then the sign of the ine¢ ciency can even be reversed.
There is a growing literature on the economics of language, which has examined a broad range of issues, such as the acquisition of a second language (Selten and Pool, 1991; Church and King, 1993, and Lazear, 1999) , the intergenerational transmission of mother tongues (John and Yi, 2001) , the role of language in foreign trade (Mélitz, 2007b) , the choice of o¢ cial languages in multilingual societies (Ginsburgh et al., 2005) , and the relationship between language policy and human capital accumulation (Ortega and Tangeras, 2008) . To the best of my knowledge the issue of language adoption in cultural goods and media markets has not yet been the subject of formal economic analysis. More closely related to the present paper is the work about the impact of English dominance on literary translation (Mélitz, 2007a; Ginsburgh et al., 2007.) These papers deal with di¤erent issues and use a very di¤erent framework. In particular, they do not examine consumers'choices between products supplied in di¤erent languages.
Despite studying a di¤erent topic, some of the results of this paper have a ‡avor similar to some established ideas in the economics of language. In particular, this paper also emphasizes the importance of the relative size of a language community. According to the literature on the acquisition of a second language, because of network externalities, it is e¢ cient that the minority invests more heavily than the majority in acquiring a second language. Thus, learning reinforces the favorable position of the majority. In this paper, the social planner also tends to undermine the presence of the minority language, in the sense that the e¢ cient proportion of varieties in the minority language is lower than the relative size of the minority community. 8 However, the discrepancy between market outcomes and the …rst best have di¤erent signs in di¤erent set ups. In the decentralized equilibrium, learners of any second language do not internalize the positive network externality and tend to underinvest with respect to the …rst best. In contrast, in the model of this paper it is very likely that the language under-represented in the market outcome (with respect to the social optimum) is the minority.
The next section presents the adoption model. Section 3 is devoted to the translation model. Some concluding remarks close the paper.
Language adoption

A model of symmetric bilingualism
The model builds on the spokes framework recently presented by Chen and Riordan (2007) , which provides a (spatial) representation of consumer preferences over an arbitrary number of di¤erentiated products. I interpret such a preference space as referring to the intrinsic characteristics (content) of cultural goods and media products. On the top of this, I introduce an additional dimension of product di¤erentiation: the language of the product. I restrict myself to the case that the number of active …rms is equal to the number of potential varieties.
9 Also, in order to enhance tractability, I use the continuous approximation of the spokes framework proposed by Caminal and Granero (2008) . Thus, the fraction of products supplied in a particular language is a continuous variable.
More speci…cally, the model considers a continuum of …rms (mass one) and consumers (also, mass one.) Each …rm produces a di¤erentiated product, which can be supplied in one of two possible languages, S and C. In the next section I allow …rms to supply two linguistic versions of the good, one in S and one in C.
Each consumer has a preference for only two varieties (de…ned in terms of intrinsic characteristics) and consumes one unit of one of these two varieties. 8 This interesting analogy was suggested by one of the referees. 9 If the number of …rms is endogenously determined by a zero pro…t condition then in equilibrium there may be excessive or insu¢ cient entry. Here, we are exclusively concerned with linguistic diversity and therefore it is very convenient to keep the diversity of intrinsic characteristics …xed. In Section 4 I discuss the implications of this assumption.
In fact, each consumer's identity is given by three elements: the pair of selected varieties, the relative preference for these two varieties (location in the [0; 1] segment) and the preferred language. Let us examine these three elements sequentially.
Consumers are uniformly distributed over all possible pairs of varieties. This implies, in particular, that the subset of consumers that have a preference for a particular variety are also uniformly distributed over their second variety. Thus, each …rm has a negligible e¤ect on the demand faced by any other individual …rm (monopolistic competition.)
A fraction of all consumers prefer to buy goods supplied in the Clanguage and 1 in the S-language. I will refer to the …rst group as Cconsumers and to the second group as S-consumers. I assume that 2 0; 1 2 , and hence we call C and S the minority and majority language, respectively. Another important modeling choice concerns the correlation between language and non-language (content) preferences. In the limiting case of perfect correlation, C-consumers would be exclusively interested in a fraction of all possible varieties and S-consumers in the remaining 1 : In this case the language adoption decision would be trivial. Alternatively, I will focus on the opposite extreme scenario and assume zero correlation between preferences about language and non-language characteristics (and zero correlation with respect to relative preferences.) Thus, all …rms face a customer base with the same distribution of linguistic preferences.
Consumers with a preference for varieties i and j are uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1] ; which represents the intensity of their relative preferences for their intrinsic characteristics. Thus, a consumer located at x 2 [0; 1], obtains a utility of R x if she consumes one unit variety i and R (1 x) if she consumes one unit of variety j. In the jargon of standard spatial models, I assume linear transportation costs and normalize the unit cost to one. Variable takes value 0 if the product is supplied in the most preferred language and 1; otherwise. Thus, > 0 represents the reduction in utility associated to the use of the least preferred language (language mismatch).
I assume that R > 2; in order to guarantee that in equilibrium all consumers are served, and that …rms are subject to constant and identical marginal costs, which for simplicity are normalized to zero. Finally, I restrict the analysis to the case < 2; otherwise …rms supplying goods in di¤erent languages would not compete with each other.
The …rst best
Let us denote by the fraction of varieties supplied in C. For a given ; there is a fraction 2 of consumers whose two selected varieties are supplied in C, a fraction 2 (1 ) with one variety in S and one in C, and a fraction (1 ) 2 with both varieties in S. For those consumers facing two varieties with the same language then e¢ ciency requires the allocation of consumers to the closest variety. Thus, the total surplus that can be obtained by consumers with access to two Cvarieties and two S-varieties is R 1 4
(1 ) and R 1 4
, respectively. The average transportation costs is in both cases
; and the only di¤erence is the weight of the language mismatch.
The optimal allocation of consumers with access to two varieties supplied in di¤erent languages will obviously depend on their language preferences. Without loss of generality suppose that the variety supplied in C is located at zero and the variety supplied in S is located at one. Thus, C-consumers should consume the variety located at zero, if and only if x min
< 1 and those C-consumers close to 1 must consume the variety supplied in S (the linguistic mismatch is dominated by the intensity of preferences over intrinsic characteristics.) However, if 1 it is optimal to allocate consumers exclusively according to their linguistic preferences. Thus, total welfare, W , can be written as:
The …rst term is the average surplus in the case that the language of the product is irrelevant ( = 0); that is, consumers'valuation of the good minus the average transportation costs, since consumers purchase from the nearest supplier. The actual level of welfare is reduced because of the costs associated to language mismatch, represented by the second and third terms. The second term is the desutility experienced by those consumers who are trapped and can only choose between two products supplied in their least preferred language. In particular, a fraction 2 (1 ) are S-consumers who only have access to two products in C, and a fraction (1 )
can only choose between two products in S. Each of these consumers incur an extra cost . Finally, the third term represents the desutility of consumers that can choose between one good in S and another one in C. These consumers either incur into additional transportation costs or they pay the language mismatch cost, . Thus, if < 1 the optimal fraction of varieties in the minority language, , is:
First, note that > 0 if and only if 2 (1 2 ). Second, < : Third, increases with both and . In order to gain some intuition let us consider the case = 0. If variety i switches from S to C, then all consumers who have a taste for variety i, face a choice between a variety in C and a variety in S. In this case, because of the linguistic switch S-consumers in average will loose 1 2 < ; since some of them will switch to their alternative variety (supplied in S). In contrast, C-consumers will gain in average 1 + 2 > , since more consumers will be induced to purchase variety i. Thus, only if is su¢ ciently high, 1 + 2 > (1 ) 1 2 , it is e¢ cient to supply variety i in S. Also, as and increase the surplus associated to supplying varieties in C also increases.
Further intuition can be gained by considering alternative speci…cations of A (t). Suppose that consumers were restricted to purchase always from the nearest supplier (that is, A ( ) = 2 ). In this case, the social planner would choose = 0: The reason is that as increases the fraction of consumers that enjoy a better language match is always inferior to the fraction that su¤ers a language mismatch: Hence, consumers'ability to reduce the costs of a language mismatch by incurring into higher transportations costs explain why > 0 (provided is not too small). Finally, suppose that the social planner only took into account the costs incurred by trapped consumers (that is, if A ( ) were equal to 0) then she would choose = : Hence, the fact that consumers with a non-trivial language choice also incur into additional costs (A > 0) explain why < . : The area of parameter values for which > 0 is depicted in Figure 1 .
Market equilibrium
In the market game …rms will adopt a particular language depending on its relative pro…tability. In a regulated environment where prices cannot vary with the language, adopting the minority language implies lower sales and hence it cannot be pro…table. Instead, if prices are endogenous, an individual …rm may …nd it optimal to adopt the minority language, charge a higher price, and exploit the higher willingness to pay of C-consumers. The speci…c details of the equilibrium do depend on …rms' ability to price discriminate between members of di¤erent language communities. If the linguistic composition of consumers exhibits su¢ cient regional variation, then …rms have incentives to set di¤erent prices in di¤erent regions. For convenience, I present …rst the perfect discrimination case (geographically segmented linguistic communities.) In Section 2.4 I discuss the case of no price discrimination.
Given that each individual …rm has a negligible in ‡uence on other …rms' decisions, it does not matter whether language adoption and price decisions are taken sequentially or simultaneously.
Let p k (l) be the price charged by a variety supplied in the k language to the l community, k; l = C; S: Consider, for instance, the price charged to Sconsumers by …rm i supplying the good in S. A fraction of these consumers have a variety in C as an alternative choice, while a fraction (1 ) have a variety in S. If we denote …rm i's price by p i then the pro…t function can be written as:
If we evaluate the …rst order condition of an interior solution at p i = p S (S) ; then the "joint" reaction function is given by:
The other three optimization problems provide three more equations. By solving the system we obtain the candidates to (symmetric, pure strategy) equilibrium prices:
We still need to check that, given these prices, no …rm wishes to deviate. It turns out that if is su¢ ciently close to 2 then a …rm supplying the product in S …nds it optimal to charge C-consumers a price higher than p S (C) and serve only those consumers who only have access to two varieties in S. Similarly, a …rm supplying the product in C …nds it optimal to charge S-consumers a price higher than p C (S) and serve only those consumers who only have access to two varieties in C. See the Appendix for the details. It turns out that for these parameter values there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
Note that a …rm that supplies its product in a particular language charges a higher price to those consumers that prefer that language: p k (k) > p k (l) ; k = C; S; and l 6 = k. In fact, the price di¤erential, p k (k) p k (l) ; decreases with the fraction of products supplied in k.
The …rm's pro…ts depend on the language adopted and the language distribution:
, provided e > 0; which implies that: e = max 0; 1 2
(1 )
Note that e > 0 if and only if > 4 (1 2 ) : Figure 1 shows that the area of parameter values for which e > 0 is smaller than than the area corresponding to > 0: More generally, we can compare the equilibrium allocation with the …rst best (Figure 2 draws e and for a given value of ):
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the adoption model exhibits insu¢ cient linguistic diversity, in the sense that the fraction of varieties in the minority language is ine¢ ciently low; i.e., e ; and provided > 0 then e < :
In order to gain some intuition about the discrepancy between social and private incentives, let us consider the case = 0: Equilibrium prices are
If a particular …rm considers switching from S to C, then this would cause an upward shift in the demand by C-consumers and a downward shift in the demand by Sconsumers. Figure 3 . However, the …rm cannot appropriate all this extra surplus because it faces two con ‡icting goals and has only one instrument: the price. On the one hand, the …rm adopting C would like to extract the extra surplus from their previous customers. On the other hand, it would like to attract new consumers (business stealing). If the …rm charges p C (C) = 1 + ; then total sales remain unchanged, and the …rm captures all the extra surplus from existing customers but it attracts no new consumer. In this case, the extra pro…ts are equivalent to area A. If instead the …rm charges p C (C) = 1; then total demand increases by an amount equal to . In this case, it attracts an e¢ cient amount of new consumers but it does not obtain any extra pro…ts from existing customers. In this case, the total amount of extra pro…ts is given by the area C, which is equivalent to A. The optimal price is an intermediate one, p C (C) = 1 + 2 , which re ‡ects the optimal balance between these two con ‡icting goals. Maximum pro…ts are given by areas A + 2B: Thus, the increase in total welfare is + 2 2 ; but the increase in pro…ts is only + . Therefore, the fraction of C-consumers that makes the shift incentive compatible for private …rms is higher than in the case of the social planner.
Discussion
No price discrimination
The assumption that …rms can perfectly discriminate between members of di¤erent linguistic communities was very convenient, but it may not be a good approximation in some real world examples. The opposite extreme case is one where …rms charge the same price to all consumers. In the Appendix it is shown that …rms adopting C are harmed more intensively than in the case they can price discriminate, and as a result incentives to adopt C are further reduced, which exacerbates the market bias against minority languages.
11
The reason is the following. Suppose that a …rm that switches from S to C pretends to attract both types of consumers; that is, it intends to set a price compatible with positive demands by both language communities. In this case, the language shift cannot be pro…table since it causes a fall in total demand: the demand by C-consumers shift upwards by an amount but the demand by S-consumers shift downwards by an amount (1 ) > . Thus, it only makes sense to switch from S to C if the …rm intends to sell to C-consumers exclusively and take advantage of their higher willingness to pay. But, of course, this will be pro…table only if the relative size of Cconsumers is su¢ ciently high so that the …rm can charge a very high price and still attract a su¢ ciently large customer base.
Asymmetric bilingualism
In the benchmark model I assumed that members of both linguistic communities are bilingual in the sense that they are competent in both languages, although every consumer has a preference for consuming the product in one of the languages. In some real world examples a fraction of consumers are monolingual and as a result language choices a¤ect aggregate sales. An important observation is that members of small language communities tend to be competent in at least a second language, while the proportion of monolingual consumers is higher in large language communities. Thus, it makes sense to consider an alternative speci…cation of the present model where Cconsumers are bilingual and have the preferences described in the benchmark model (they experience a utility loss if they consume the good in S) but S-consumers are monolingual and hence experience an in…nite utility loss if they consume the good in C.
In the Appendix I analyze both the …rst best allocation and the market equilibrium of this version of the model. I show that both and e are lower than in the benchmark model, which is a very intuitive result. What is more important, is that the main insights brought about by Proposition 1 remain unchanged:
e ; and if > 0 then > e (market outcomes are biased against minority languages).
Advertising
Suppliers of some media products (TV, radio) charge a zero price to consumers. Instead, they obtain revenue from advertising. Does the …nancing channel a¤ect the language choice? Let us consider a version of the present model where …rms charge a zero price but they obtain an advertising revenue A. Consumers'net utility is a decreasing function of the intensity of advertising, (A), where 0 < 0; 00 < 0: 12 Thus, instead of paying a price consumers experience a desutility associated with advertising. In order to attract consumers, …rms can reduce the intensity of advertising instead of cutting the price (in this case it is not feasible to discriminate between members of different linguistic communities). It turns out the main qualitative properties of Proposition 1 remain unchanged with respect to the …nancing channel (See Appendix.) A …rm that adopts the minority language will tend to increase the intensity of advertising trying to exploit C-consumers'higher willingness to pay, but again the ability to appropriate a su¢ cient amount of surplus using this channel is very limited.
Second best
The main result of this section is that market forces tend to deliver insuf…cient linguistic diversity. This result provides a possible justi…cation for government intervention based purely on e¢ ciency grounds. A possible instrument would be production subsidies to suppliers of goods in minority languages. However, in order to implement the …rst best, we would need to design those subsidies in a way that they eliminate the price distortion associated to language choices. A much simpler policy would consist of subsidies conditional only on language choices. In order to justify such policy we would need to compare equilibrium outcomes with a second best scenario, in which total welfare is computed conditional on the distortionary price behavior predicted in equilibrium. If we let be the fraction of varieties supplied in the minority language, then (see Appendix) e ; and the inequality is strict for those parameter values such that 0: In other words, subsidies to …rms producing the good in the minority language can improve the e¢ ciency of market outcomes.
Translations
Suppose now that each …rm can choose one of the following three options: (i) supply the product in S, (ii) supply the product in C, and (iii) supply two linguistic versions of the product, one in S and one in C, and pay an extra cost F > 0: 
The …rst best
The fraction of varieties available in S and C is 1 c and 1 s ; respectively. As in the previous section, the optimal allocation of consumers in those segments where the two varieties are supplied in a di¤erent language will depend on whether is higher or lower than 1: In the Appendix I present the case > 1, but in the text I restrict attention to the case 1: A fraction (1 c ) 2 of S-consumers have access to two varieties in S and hence the average surplus is R . Finally, a fraction 2 c (1 c ) have access to one variety in each language and the average surplus taking into account the optimal allocation of those consumers is R : The expressions are analogous for C consumers. Thus, total welfare is:
where s + c 1. If we denote by z F then the candidates to be the optimal values of s and c are given by the …rst order conditions of an interior solution:
It turns out that e s (z)+ e c (z) is sometimes higher than 1 (the constraint is binding). It will be useful to consider Condition A :
i.e.,
Note that for those parameter values that satisfy Condition A the adoption model prescribes = 0: If Condition A holds then for all values of z such that e c (z) > 0 we have that e s (z) = 1: Therefore, in this case the optimal values are c = 0 and s = e s (z) : That is, if z 1 + 2 , then all varieties are supplied exclusively in S: However, as z falls below 1 + 2 an increasing number of varieties is supplied in both languages.
If Condition A fails then it is possible to have both s and c strictly positive. There are two possible regions. If z (2 2 ) then s = e s (2 2 ) and c = e c (2 2 ). That is, if translation costs are su¢ ciently high then there are no translations and language choices coincide with those of the adoption model. Alternatively, if z < (2 2 ) ; then s = e s (z) and c = e c (z). It is immediate to check that: (i) s c , (ii) neither s nor c decrease with F; and (iii) both s and c may increase or decrease with : The economic intuitions are straightforward.
Market equilibrium
The pricing game is analogous to the one discussed in Section 2.
14 Thus, equilibrium prices are given by:
Pro…ts from supplying the product in S and C exclusively are given respectively by:
Pro…ts from supplying the product in both languages are given by:
In equilibrium, …rms must be indi¤erent between those options which are e¤ectively used. In particular, the equilibrium candidates of s and c are given by the system of equations
If we solve the system disregarding the condition s + c 1, then the equilibrium candidates are given by:
It is also the case that b s (z) + b c (z) is sometimes higher than 1. Thus, we can divide the parameter space in two regions. Let us label Condition B :
i.e., We can now compare the equilibrium and the …rst best allocations. Since we have two endogenous variables we could in principle discuss the discrepancy between social and private incentives to supply goods in each language, and hence split the parameter space in four regions, depending on whether (1 e h ) (1 h ) = h e h is positive or negative for each language h, h = S; C. However, it is much more convenient to de…ne an index of linguistic diversity. In particular, let be the di¤erence between the total number of varieties in C and the total number of varieties in S:
We can say that an equilibrium exhibits insu¢ cient (excessive) linguistic diversity if e < ( e > ). It turns out that that the two regions are simply de…ned by a threshold value, b z: If Condition B holds then b z = 1; otherwise b z = 2 (1 ) 1 4 < 1: This discussion is summarized in the next Proposition Proposition 2 The equilibrium of the translations model may exhibit insu¢ cient or excessive linguistic diversity. More speci…cally, there exists a threshold value of z; b z; such that if z 2 b z; 1 + 2 then e < ; and if z 2 1 2 ; b z then e > :
Figure 4 depicts e and in the three possible scenarios, depending on whether or not Conditions A and B hold. In particular, Figure 4a correspond to the case that both conditions hold, Figure 4b to the case Condition B holds but Condition A fails, and Figure 4c to the case that both conditions fail.
The literature on product diversity under monopolistic competition has emphasized that markets may generate too little or too much variety. The last proposition apparently conveys a similar ‡avor of ambiguity. However, standard models of product variety provide little guidance about the set of circumstances under which market bias has one sign or the opposite. In contrast, in our model excessive or insu¢ cient linguistic diversity are closely linked to observable variables. Thus, if we observe a relatively small fraction of varieties in the minority language then the model suggests that there is 15 The main advantage of this index is that it preserves the linearity with respect to z: An obvious alternative would be to de…ne the index as the proportion of varieties in C: = : Thus, all varieties are available in S; and one half are available in C: Hence, we need to worry about excessive linguistic variety only when the fraction of varieties available in the minority language is more than . Hence, the number of translations is higher than 1 2
. Summarizing:
Remark 3 The sign of the ine¢ ciency is closely linked to the degree of linguistic diversity observed in equilibrium. In particular, excessive linguistic diversity requires that more than one half of all possible varieties are supplied in the minority language, independently of the relative size of the minority linguistic community.
In order to gain some economic intuition about the result that the market may provide either insu¢ cient or excessive linguistic diversity, let us consider the limiting case = 1 2 . In this case the size of both communities is the same and the equilibrium level of linguistic diversity is always e¢ cient. In fact, : However, private incentives could be excessive or insu¢ cient with respect to social incentives. It turns out that the level of translations in equilibrium and in the …rst best are given, respectively, by:
Therefore, the number of translations in equilibrium, whenever is strictly positive, is socially excessive, except if the …xed cost is so low that both in equilibrium and in the …rst best all varieties are translated (See Figure 5) .
It is important to note that, in this model, translations do not expand aggregate demand and they simply allow some consumers to access a better combination of linguistic and non-linguistic characteristics. In most spatial models with single-product …rms and when aggregate demand e¤ects are absent, there is a tendency towards excessive product variety. Private incentives to introduce a new variety are higher than social incentives because all customers of a new variety are stolen from rival …rms.
In our model, suppliers are potentially multi-product …rms and hence must be concerned about the origin of the potential consumers of the second version: some of them are stolen from rival …rms but some others simply switch across di¤erent linguistic versions of the same variety (the so-called cannibalization e¤ect). Thus, the strength of the business-stealing e¤ect is directly proportional to the weakness of the cannibalization e¤ect. If the number of translations is small then the cannibalization e¤ect is relatively important, which moderates private incentives to translate. In this case the market outcome turns out to be close to the …rst best. However, as the number of translations increases the cannibalization e¤ect gets weaker (the business stealing e¤ect gets stronger) and private incentives to translate overgrow private incentives.
Summarizing, Proposition 2 is a combination of the underprovision of linguistic variety in the adoption model (Proposition 1) and the excessive private incentives to translate. If the …xed cost of translation is high then the number of translations is small and the forces behind Proposition 1 dominate. If the …xed cost is su¢ ciently low, then the dominant e¤ect is the excessive private incentives to translate and we end up with excessive linguistic variety. 
Concluding remarks
In some cultural goods and media markets it seems prohibitively expensive to supply the same content in more than one language. The model presented in this paper predicts that, under laissez-faire, the level of linguistic diversity in these markets will be ine¢ ciently low. From a positive viewpoint, this result may contribute to explain why consumption in minority languages is surprisingly low in regions with bilingual population (like the case of Catalonia discussed in the introduction). It could also rationalize some widespread concerns about the potential negative consequences of the expansion of English as a second language on the use and development of other languages. From a normative point of view, this result can justify on purely e¢ ciency grounds certain public policies that aim at protecting minority languages.
However, the analysis also suggests that the development of new technologies that reduce the costs of translations is likely to improve the e¢ ciency of market outcomes, and, in the limit, it could even result in an overprovision of goods in minority languages. Whether or not translation costs are in the real world higher or lower than the threshold value, b z, at least in some speci…c markets, is di¢ cult to assess. However, Remark 3 suggests that we only need to worry about excessive linguistic diversity if we ever observe that goods in minority languages are heavily over-represented with respect to the relative size of their community.
The main results of the paper are shown to be robust to changes in various speci…c assumptions of the base model: (i) whether or not members of the majority community are competent in the minority language, (ii) …rms' ability to price discriminate between members of the various linguistic communities, (iii) …rms'…nancing channels (charging a price versus advertising), and (iv) comparison of the equilibrium allocation with the …rst or the second best allocations. The latter point is particularly relevant for policy implications. In the context of the adoption model, for instance, the government can raise total welfare by using ‡at subsidies to …rms supplying the good in the minority language.
The role of other assumptions is more di¢ cult to assess. Let us discuss three additional issues. First, it was assumed that all potential varieties are produced and, as a result, language choices do not a¤ect aggregate sales. It is well know (see, for instance, Chen and Riordan, 2007 ) that if we consider the number of varieties (de…ned in terms of content) as an additional endogenous variable, then the market may provide too much or too little variety with re-spect to …rst best. Thus, assuming that all potential varieties are produced not only facilitates the analysis but it also helps to focus our attention on the provision of linguistic diversity, at the cost of ignoring other sources of market failure. Second, it was assumed that consumer preferences over language and intrinsic characteristics are independent. In the other extreme scenario the set of varieties is partitioned into two groups and each linguistic community cares only about one group, which is di¤erent for the two communities. In this case the two dimensions of product di¤erentiation collapse into one, the market becomes completely fragmented, and the linguistic bias disappears. In intermediate cases (partial correlation) I expect intermediate outcomes.
I conjecture that the degree of correlation may a¤ect the magnitude of the welfare losses, but the qualitative results are likely to remain unchanged. Third, the market outcome is derived under the assumption of a large number of single-product …rms (monopolistic competition). It would be desirable to extend the analysis and consider the impact of large multi-product …rms. Unfortunately, this would bring about new e¤ects which are di¢ cult to handle. In particular, the linguistic decisions of multi-product …rms would a¤ect their rivals' prices. Caminal and Granero (2008) have studied the impact of multi-product …rms on (one-dimensional) product diversity in the spokes framework. It is not yet clear whether or not the analysis can be extended to the case of two dimensions of product di¤erentiation.
As mentioned in the introduction, the relationship between market outcomes and consumer preferences is dynamic with causality running both ways. In this paper consumer preferences are taken as exogenous. The next step would be to consider how market outcomes a¤ect the intergenerational transmission of mother tongues and the incentives of potentially mutilingual individuals to learn more languages. This is clearly an important topic with a high priority in my personal research agenda. Alternatively, the …rm may consider to deviate and charge a higher price and sell the good only to those consumers who have access to two varieties in S:
In this case, the maximum amount of pro…ts is (1 ) 1 4 2 . Hence, the deviation will be pro…table if and only if 1 , where 1 is given by:
Similarly, if a producer of the product in C follows the prescribed prices then the level of pro…ts form selling the good to S-consumers is given by h 1
(1 ) 2 i 2 . In this case, by deviating and selling the good only to Sconsumers who have access to both products in S; it can obtain an amount of pro…ts equal to . In this case e = 0 for all 2, and hence the equilibrium always exists. Instead, consider = 1; 78:Thus, existence is only an issue in a relatively small parameter range.
The adoption model without price discrimination
Let p s and p c the prices set in equilibrium by a …rm supplying a variety in S and in C, respectively. Hence, in contrast to the analysis of Section 2, …rms cannot price discriminate according to linguistic preferences.
In those segments where consumers have access to one variety in each language, we denote by x C (C) and x C (S) the fraction of C-consumers that purchase the variety in C and in S, respectively. If both x C (C) and x C (S) belong to the interval [0; 2] then they are given by:
Let us …rst consider the case < 1. Then, both x C (C) and
However, a …rm can never …nd it optimal to supply the variety in C and set a price within this interval. More speci…cally, if …rm i adopts S then total sales are given by:
Alternatively, …rm i's sales from adopting C are given by:
For all p i in the relevant range; q
That is, adopting C would imply a contraction of demand and hence it cannot be optimal. Therefore, if a …rm adopts C it must be because it intends to set a su¢ ciently high price so that x C (S) = 0: More speci…cally, …rm i's pro…ts from adopting C can be written as:
Evaluating the …rst order condition of an interior solution at p i = p C we obtain the candidate of the "joint" reaction function of …rms supplying their varieties in C:
Firm i's pro…ts from adopting S can be written as:
Evaluating the …rst order condition at p i = p S we obtain the candidate of the "joint" reaction function of …rms supplying their varieties in S:
Thus, equations (1) and (2) can determine the equilibrium values of p S and p C for a given . The equilibrium value of is given by the equal pro…ts condition evaluated at equilibrium prices:
S ( ) = C ( ) ; which are given by:
We can now compute the parameter values for which e 0: Note that p S ( = 0) = 1; and p C ( = 0) = 1 + 2 . Using these prices the inequality S ( = 0) C ( = 0) is equivalent to 2 1 p 1 : Thus, in the absence of price discrimination, the set of parameters that can sustain an equilibrium with a positive fraction of C-products is smaller than in the case of price discrimination.
Equations (1) and (2) plus the equal pro…ts condition determine the equilibrium values provided no …rm has incentives to deviate from the proposed behavior. However, if is su¢ ciently high then …rms producing a product in S …nd it optimal to deviate and set a higher price,
, and give up selling to C-consumers with access to a variety in C; i.e., 1 + p
In this case a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. Note that if = 0 there are no incentives to deviate. These incentives are present only if is su¢ ciently high which involves a higher value of :
Numerical simulations can provide a good idea of the extent of the existence problem as well as the market bias against minority language in cases a symmetric equilibrium does exist. A selection of results are given in the following table (n.e. stands for "no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists"): 
Asymmetric bilingualism
Let us now consider the case that only C-consumers are bilingual, while Sconsumers are monolingual. In other words, C-consumers incur a utility loss, , if they consume a product in S, but S-consumers experience an in…nite utility loss if they consume the product in C.
Let us begin by computing the …rst best allocation for the case < 1: Among those consumers with access to two C-varieties only C-consumers can enjoy a positive surplus. Since they must consume the closest variety the maximum total surplus is R . The allocation of consumers with access to one variety in each language depends on their linguistic preferences. C-consumers are willing to consume the variety in S if their distance is lower than 1
, and S-consumers always consume the variety in S, independently of their location. Thus, the maximum total surplus is R : Finally, consumers with access to two varieties in S always choose the closest variety and the maximum total surplus is R It can easily be checked that is lower in cases where S-consumers are unable to enjoy a product in C.
In the market game competition for C-consumers is exactly like that in Section 2.3. However, …rms supplying the good in C cannot compete for S-consumers. As a result, p S (S) = 1 : Thus, for those parameters that de…ne the limits of this set, > 0: In other words, asymmetric bilingualism simply reduces both the optimal fraction of varieties in C and the equilibrium fraction. But the qualitative properties of Proposition 1 still hold.
Advertising
Suppose consumers experience a utility loss which depends on the intensity of advertising, (A) = : Thus, if consumers choose between two varieties in S then demand for variety i is given by:
where A i and A are the advertising revenue of …rm i and the average …rm, respectively. Hence, …rm i chooses A i in order to maximize i = A i x i . In a symmetric equilibrium, A i = A = p c: Thus, if = 0 …rms make pro…ts S ( = 0) = p c: If a …rm j considers supplying the good in C then, for reasons discussed in Subsection 5.1, it aims at selling exclusively to C-consumers. In this case, the optimal level of advertising, A j , maximizes:
Thus, the maximum amount of pro…ts is C ( = 0) = p c 1 + 2 3 3 2 : The set of parameters that involve e 0 is given by S ( = 0) S ( = 0) : Note that this set is a subset of the set of parameters that support e 0 in the case …rms can extract consumer surplus through prices, but they cannot discriminate between members of di¤erent linguistic communities (Section 5.1). In other words, the advertising channel reinforces the underprovision of linguistic diversity.
The second best
Let us characterize the second best allocation; that is, the optimal ; denoted ; conditional on the allocation of consumers resulting from distortionary prices. In other words, in those segments where consumers have access to one variety in C and one in S, …rms would set equilibrium prices computed in section 2.3. Thus, in these segments only those C-consumers located at a distance lower than from the S-variety purchase this one and the rest purchase the C-variety. Similarly, only those S-consumers located at a distance lower than 1 2 + 4 from the S-variety purchase this one, and the rest purchase the C-variety. Total surplus obtained in these segments is given by R If we compare the above equation with those corresponding to the …rst best and equilibrium, we conclude that e , and the inequalities are strict except in the case that both variables take value zero. We can conclude that there is room for a simple policy intervention consisting on subsidies exclusively based on language choices. 
